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ABSTRACT

Public-private sectoral wage differentials have been studied extensively using quantile
regression techniques. These typically find large public sector premiums at the bottom
of the wage distribution. This may imply that low skill workers are ‘overpaid’, prompting
concerns over efficiency. We note several other potential explanations for this result
and explicitly test whether the premium varies with skill, using Australian data. We use
a quasi-differenced GMM panel data model which has not been previously applied to
this topic, internationally. Unlike other available methods, this technique identifies
sectoral differences in returns to unobserved skill. It also facilitates a decomposition of
the wage gap into components explained by differences in returns to all (observed and
unobserved) skills and by differences in their stock. We find no evidence to suggest that
the premium varies with skill. One interpretation is that the compressed wage profile of
the public sector induces the best workers (on unobserved skills) to join the public
sector in low wage occupations, vice versa in high wage occupations. We also estimate
the average public sector premium to be 6% for women and statistically insignificant
(4%) for men.
JEL classification codes: J45, J31, J38
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I

INTRODUCTION

In developed countries, the distributions of wages in the public sector are typically more
condensed than in the private sector (see for example the review of Gregory and Borland 1999;
and cross-national evidence from Lucifora and Muers 2006). Studies using quantile regressions
and quantile regression decompositions find that this is not fully explained by the mix of ‘skill’
(proxied by education and years of experience) in the two sectors (Birch 2006; Blackaby et al.
1998; Cai and Liu 2011; Gregory and Borland 1999; Lucifora and Muers 2006; Melly 2005; Mueller
1998). A typical finding across countries and sexes is that public sector workers at the bottom of
the wage distribution receive a large pay premium (holding education and experience constant),
whilst public sector workers near the top of the wage distribution receive a wage penalty, or a
small premium. Such results motivate concerns that low-skill public sector workers are overpaid,
resulting in public sector inefficiency, whilst high-skill public sector workers are underpaid, leading
to difficulties in retainment (Birch 2006; Lucifora and Muers 2006; Mueller 1998). These concerns
assume that the quantile regression findings reflect a public sector wage premium that varies with
skill. In other words, the public sector may provide lower overall returns to skill (whilst paying a
premium that is independent of skill). But there are other possible explanations for the quantile
regression results. There may be greater variation in private sector wages for each given level of
skill (Bender 2003). It is also possible that in this context, education and experience are
inadequate proxies of skill which bias the results (we expand on this suggestion below). The
source of these results has major implications for assessing public sector efficiency as well as for
interpreting the effect of public sector employment on the distribution of wages. Are low skill
public sector workers overpaid, whilst high skill public sector workers are underpaid? Our primary
aim in this paper is to examine explicitly whether the public sector wage premium varies with skill.
We feel that insufficient consideration has been given in this literature to the role of
‘unobservables’ in the sorting of workers into sectors. In most studies, experience and education
are the only proxies for skill. To illustrate the possible implication of this, consider the notion that
workers with little experience or education are better paid in the public sector than in the private
sector, vice versa for more educated and experienced workers. This is implicit in the results of
studies which estimate separate wage equations for each sector which find that returns to
education and earnings are lower in the public sector (see the review by Bender 1998; and recent
evidence for Australia in Birch 2006). But economic theory (and common sense) suggests that less
educated and inexperienced workers would hence prefer to work in the public sector, vice versa
for more educated and experienced workers. If employers (in hiring, firing and promotions)
observe better indicators of skill than are available to econometricians, the standard quantile
2

regression results may be partially (or completely) explained by bias due to sector selection. There
are many such indicators of skill available to employers, even at the stage of recruitment. These
include the relevance of qualifications (field of study), the quality of the institution of study,
relevance of work experience (firms and industries worked for), proxies of intelligence and work
ethic (school grades), interpersonal skills (observed during the interview) and so on. Thus it is
conceivable that the lower public sector returns to observables are offset by sector sorting on
unobservables, due to the information that is available to employers (but not econometricians).
This argument concords with the corresponding union wage effects literature. Reviewing the
empirical evidence, Card et al. (2004) argue that failure to account for unobserved characteristics
leads to overstating the extent to which union wage effect varies with skill (see also Card 1996).
Selectivity corrections would seem to be a potential solution to this problem. These have been
used extensively in the related literature on decomposing the mean wage premium (Gregory and
Borland 1999). They have also been attempted in a quantile regression context (Melly 2006).
However, selectivity corrections have major limitations in this context. They cannot differentiate
between sectoral differences in the stock of unobserved skills from sectoral differences in returns
to such skills. They do not, therefore, facilitate Oaxaca-type decompositions which treat observed
and unobserved skills symmetrically (Gyourko and Tracy 1988; Neuman and Oaxaca 2004).
Secondly, there appears to be a lack of credible exclusion restrictions to implement such
methods. 1 Further, sector selection is a non standard selection problem, since workers select
from a set of potential employers and vice versa (see Card 1996; Farber 1983 in the related
context of union status). Fixed effects quantile regressions have also been developed (Bargain and
Melly 2008). But they too do not allow for differences in returns to unobservables.
Here, we address these issues through an alternate approach. We implement an estimator
proposed by Lemieux (1993; 1998), using Australian data. This is a quasi-differenced panel data
model, estimated by GMM. To our knowledge, it is the only available estimator that fully
1

Some have used father’s sector of employment as an exclusion restriction (e.g. Bender, 2003; Dustmann

and van Soest, 1998; Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1993; Hou, 1993; Melly, 2006; Terrell, 1993). Such estimates
are biased if intergenerationally transmitted attitudes to public sector employment are correlated with
intergenerationally transmitted (unobserved) skills. Others have used attitudes towards unions (eg. Bender,
2003; Heitmeuller, 2006; Melly, 2006), which are likely to be endogenous to working in a unionised
environment. Some use parent’s education (Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1993; Hou, 1993), which is also likely
to be correlated with unobserved skills. Others have used age (Borland et al., 1998; Kanellopoulos, 1997).
But age is correlated with risk aversion (Halek and Eisenhauer, 2001; Pålsson, 1996), which may be
rewarded differently in the two sectors (Gregory and Borland, 1999).
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disentangles returns from stocks of all (observed and unobserved) skills and it has not been
applied to this topic before. In our adaptation, we use a single index of (latent) skill. Our main
interest is in whether returns to this concept of skill vary between sectors. We find no evidence of
differences in returns. This conforms to our expectations of sector sorting on unobserved
characteristics and it informs the interpretation of established quantile regression results. We also
decompose the average wage gap into the components explained by returns and stocks of (all)
skills. We estimate a positive average public sector premium for women and an insignificant
positive premium for men.
The estimator is discussed in Section II. The data source is the Household Income and Labour
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) panel survey, which is described in Section III. Section IV presents
results, including estimated parameters, a decomposition of the raw average wage gap, sensitivity
tests and comparisons with other estimators. Section V offers conclusions.

II METHODS
The model is adapted from Lemieux (1993, 1998), who used a similar approach to estimate the
effect of unions on wages. 2 The intuition of the model is in some respects similar to that of a firstdifference model. The key parameters are estimated by sector movers and sector choice can be
correlated with (unobserved) characteristics. The main innovation of Lemieux’s approach is that
unlike all other approaches used for this topic, it accounts for differences between sectors in
returns to unobserved characteristics. The method is centred around a single wage equation of
the following form:

ln wit = δ tR + Pit δ + X it [ β R + Pit ( β P − β R )] + [1 + Pit (ψ − 1)]θ i + ε it

(1)

The wage observed for employee i at time t is a function of sector (P = 1 if the employee is in the
public sector and zero otherwise), job characteristics (X), a single (latent) index of skill (θ) and an
idiosyncratic error. The coefficient δ represents a constant public sector premium, independent
of skill. Returns to skills are allowed to differ between sectors through ψ . If ψ = 1, returns to skills
are equal across sectors. If ψ < 1, returns to skills are systematically lower in the public sector that
the private sector, which would imply that any public sector wage premium is smaller for high skill
workers than for low skill workers, vice versa if ψ > 1. Our main interest is thus to test whether ψ
= 1. The only job characteristics (X) of interest are those which attract compensation for working
2

See also Gibbons et al. (2005) who use a similar approach in the context of industry wage models.
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conditions (such as shift work, or an absence of job security or leave entitlements). Returns to
such job characteristics (β) are also allowed to differ by sector, with the superscripts P and R
denoting returns in the public and private sectors, respectively.

A

Decomposition of the Raw Sectoral Wage Gap

If estimable, the parameters in (1) can be used in a decomposition of the raw average wage gap,
which distinguishes between the effects of differences in the stock of skills and job characteristics
as well as the effects of differences in returns to both skills and job characteristics. Consider the
mean wage difference between sectors:

ln( wP ) − ln( wR ) =
(δ tP + β P X P +ψθ P ) − (δ tR + β R X R + θ R )
= δ + β P X P − β R X R + ψθ P − θ R
= [δ + X P ( β P − β R ) + (ψ − 1)θ R ] + [( X P − X R ) β R + (θ P − θ R )]

(2)

The contents of the first square brackets represent the effects of differences in wage setting
policies, which includes a constant difference ( δ ) and differences in returns to characteristics.
The second term represents the effects of differences in characteristics.

B

Estimation 3

The first step to estimate (1) is to ‘quasi-difference’ the wage equation. That is, to substitute θ for
the expression obtained when θ is made the subject of the argument in a first lag as follows:

θ i = [ln wit −1 − (δ tR−1 + Pit −1δ + X it −1[ β R + Pit −1 ( β P − β R )] + ε it −1 ] /[1 + Pit −1 (ψ − 1)]

(3)

Substituting into (1):

ln wit = Ft ( X it , Pit ) +

[1 + Pit (ψ − 1)]
× [ln wit −1 − Ft −1 ( X it −1 , Pit −1 )] + eit
[1 + Pit −1 (ψ − 1)]

where:

eit = ε it −

[1 + Pit (ψ − 1)]
ε it −1
[1 + Pit −1 (ψ − 1)]

and
3

Analysis was conducted using SAS V9 and Stata V11.
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(4)

Ft ( X it , Pit ) = δ tR + Pit δ + X it [ β R + Pit ( β P − β R )]
Equation (4) is nonlinear and includes an endogenous regressor: ln wit −1 , which is correlated with

ε it −1 and hence with eit . It would seem natural for ln wit −1 to be instrumented by ln wit −2 , which
is available for this study. However, the likely serial correlation between ε it − 2 and ε it −1 renders

ln wit −2 an invalid instrument. This is because the sample (described in Section III) is restricted to
job changers between t-1 and t, most of whom did not also change jobs between t-2 and t-1.
Given that ε’ will include a job-specific component, the correlation between ε it − 2 and ε it −1 will be
greater than between ε it −1 and ε it . As such, ln wit −2 will also be correlated with eit .
An alternative instrument is the interaction of the lagged and unlagged sector indicators: Pit Pit −1 .
The complete sector history indicators described by Lemieux (1998) are equivalent to the three
sector variables: Pit , Pit −1 and Pit Pit −1 . The validity of Pit Pit −1 as an instrument follows from the
assumed exogeneity of Pit and Pit −1 . The relevance of Pit Pit −1 as an instrument for ln wit −1 results
from the correlation between Pit Pit −1 and θi . In other words, Pit Pit −1 is a relevant instrument if
the average skill of public sector joiners is different to the average skill of public sector leavers
(see Lemieux 1993: Appendix 1 for further discussion of these issues). Since θi is not observed,
this is difficult to test. 4 However, an approximate alternative is to test whether the average wage
of joiners is different to that of leavers (averaged across their public and private sector
observations). The three sector variables are also interacted with X it −1 and X it to create further
instruments.
Equation (4) can be estimated efficiently by GMM. The GMM estimator minimises the following
objective function:

e(α )′ZWZ ′e(α )
where the weighting matrix W is the inverse of the estimated variance matrix of the moment
functions, estimated by NLIV (see Davidson and MacKinnon 1993; Greene 2003; Hansen 1982).
In order to separately identify δ tR , δ tR−1 and δ , it is necessary to impose a further restriction on
the parameters. The mean value of θ across all people and both years is constrained to be zero:
4

In linear IV, instrument relevance can be determined by testing the significance of the instrument(s) in the

first stage regression. This is not the case for nonlinear GMM (see Stock et al., 2002).
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 1 
∑ (θˆit + θˆit −1 ) = 0
 2N  i

θ =

(5)

where N is the number of people and

θˆis = {ln wis − (δ sR + Pisδ + X is [ β R + Pis ( β P − β R )]} /[1 + Pis (ψ − 1)] for s ∈ (t , t − 1) (6)
This restriction involves the sum of a nonlinear function across the entire sample. However, it can
be easily imposed by noting that the denominator of this expression can only take two values: 1
and ψ.

C

Identification

The estimates of δ and ψ are identified only by movers between sectors. This can be seen by
noting that both disappear from (4) when Pit = Pit −1 . Thus reasonable estimates of δ and ψ can
only be obtained with a data set that has a sufficiently large number of movers.
Similarly, the coefficients of X in each sector (βP and βR) are only independently identified by
people whose X changes between t-1 and t. In the present application, only job characteristics are
included in X. In principle, observed time varying human capital variables could also be included in
X. Consider the standard human capital variables: experience and education. Sectoral differences
in returns to education could be identified by individuals (in each sector) whose educational
attainment changed between observations. In the case of experience, the main issue for
identification is the ability to distinguish it’s effect from that of pure wage inflation or other
changes between observations that affect all workers (as measured by δ tR − δ tR−1 ). The returns to
experience could thus be identified by the set of people whose experience increased by less than
the time elapsed between observations.
An alternate identification strategy is used in this paper. Education can be treated as time
invariant if people whose highest educational qualification changed between t-1 and t (of whom
there are very few as shown in the following section) are excluded from the analysis. Education
can thus be incorporated as a component of θ, and differences in returns to education can be
incorporated in ψ. This highlights a key difference between this model and standard panel data
models. In a FE model, leaving education in θ implies an assumption of no sectoral differences in
returns to education. This is not the case here. Thus differences in time invariant skills (including
education) are identified by movers between sectors. One advantage of this identification
strategy is that it does not require any education changers. By leaving education in θ, the
7

approach also avoids several other problems characteristic of the standard panel data approach.
These include the assumptions that returns to education are immediate rather than lagged and
that returns to education for students who simultaneously work are representative of all
employees. It also avoids ambiguity over whether the highest level of educational qualification is
the appropriate human capital measure, or whether the total quantity of education (in years) is
more appropriate. A consequence of this strategy is that sectoral differences in returns to
education are not separately identified from differences in returns to other time invariant skills.
A similar strategy is available to incorporate the effects of experience. Since the two observations
are only one year apart, experience is almost completely time invariant and can thus be
incorporated into θ , similarly to the treatment of education. The effect of the last one year
increase in experience is incorporated into δ tR − δ tR−1 . 5

D

Exogenous Switching Assumption

The model relies on the assumption that sector choice is uncorrelated with e, conditional on X
and θ. It allows sector selection to be correlated with θ. But it does not allow for the possibility
that workers switch sectors due to changes in person and sector specific productivity (i.e. timevarying comparative advantage). Lemieux argues that this problem is reduced by considering only
involuntary job changers. These were people who changed jobs due to ‘plant closing, family
responsibilities, illness, geographic moves, dismissal, or other forms of layoffs’. This is
problematic. Workers may be dismissed or laid off precisely due to a fall in sector-specific
productivity (especially if institutional constraints prevent a wage reduction). Even if an
involuntary job loss is assumed exogenous, there is no reason to believe that subsequent sector
choice is unaffected by time-varying comparative advantage. Thus we do not follow Lemieux’s
approach of limiting the sample to the set of involuntary job changers. In any case, the number of
5

It is acknowledged that the effect of a one year increase in experience may differ across the experience

distribution, as reflected by the standard practice of including experience in quadratic form in wage
equations (Mincer, 1974; Preston, 1997). It would be possible to include experience in quadratic form in the
wage equation here. This is not pursued for a number of reasons. First, such an inclusion would make the
interpretation of ψ more difficult. In the preferred model, ψ facilitates a simple assessment of whether
differences in returns to skills differ between sectors. Second, the nonlinearity in returns to experience
would only be identified through an increase in one year of experience for each employee. To reiterate the
nature of this restriction, it assumes that returns to the last single year of experience do not vary across
experience levels. However, there is no restriction to the functional form of returns to all previous years of
experience. This restriction is thus unlikely to be of any substantive consequence.
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job changers who report changing jobs involuntarily is too small in HILDA to adopt this approach,
as it would reduce the sample size by approximately 75%.
Instead, we provide empirical support (in the next section) for the exogenous switching
assumption. The rationale is based on the following arguments. If time-varying comparative
advantage were an important factor in sector switching, one would expect to find an apparent
public sector premium for public sector joiners and a corresponding private sector premium for
public sector leavers. In other words, switching sectors would be associated with an increased
wage, regardless of the direction of the switch. With purely exogenous switching, one would
expect to see a public sector premium (or penalty) that does not depend on the direction of the
switch (public to private or private to public). This is indeed what we find in the data. Next, even if
time-varying comparative advantage were an important factor in sector switches, it would only
bias the key results in specific circumstances. The mean public sector premium would be biased
up (down) only to the extent that the number of public sector joiners (leavers) in the sample
dominate the number of leavers (joiners). A similar argument holds for ψ. Time-varying
comparative advantage would lead to downward bias in ψ only to the extent that public sector
leavers are concentrated at the top of the skill distribution (relative to joiners), vice versa for an
upward bias. Whilst the distribution of θ is not attainable, the wage distribution of leavers and
joiners (averaged across their public and private sector observations) is arguably a close substitute
in the present context. We will show that this distribution is similar for leavers and joiners.

E

Factors Not Included in the Model

Some factors that may affect sectoral wage differences have not been incorporated in the model
and need to be taken into account when interpreting the results. In particular, earnings are an
incomplete measure of the total return to labour. Employees may be willing to accept lower
earnings in exchange for other benefits. Superannuation and paid maternity leave entitlements
may be important considerations and both are more generous in the public sector.
Employer contributions to superannuation are a major component of total remuneration. Under
the Superannuation Guarantee, employers have been required to contribute to each employee’s
superannuation at a rate equal to at least 9% of earnings since 2002. Historically, superannuation
in the public sector has been generous. The Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme commenced
in 1922, providing some public sector retirees with a defined benefit pension equal to up to 70%
of their final salary, indexed to inflation (Department of Finance and Administration 2001).
Subsequent reforms have resulted in less generous pensions. If superannuation schemes remain
more generous in the public sector, this may have a downward effect on public sector earnings
9

through a compensating wage differential. However, sectoral comparisons of employer
contributions are hampered by differences in the benefit structures of superannuation schemes.
Schemes fall into three main structures: accumulation, defined benefits and a hybrid of the two.
In accumulation funds, employers contribute superannuation continuously, in proportion to
earnings. In defined benefit funds, the value of employer contributions is unknown at the time
that wages are earned because the benefits are often defined in relation to employees’ final
salary. For this reason, the major recent survey of superannuation in Australia, the Survey of
Employment Arrangements and Superannuation (SEAS), only provides a measure of employer
contributions for those who have active accumulation funds (and no defined benefit or hybrid
accounts) (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001). This excludes 63% of public sector employee
respondents and 15% of those in the private sector. For the remaining sample, average employer
contributions are similar in the two sectors (6.6% in the public sector and 6.8% in the private
sector). 6 This is unlikely to be a good indication of the overall generosity of employer
contributions in the public sector. It does suggest, however, that few private sector employees
receive more than the minimum legislated contribution from their employer.
Paid maternity leave was not mandatory In Australia until January 2011 (after the period of data
coverage used here). In the pre-2011 era at least, public sector employers were much more likely
to provide paid maternity leave than private sector employers. In 2005, the Australian Bureau of
Statistics surveyed women who had a child under two years of age. Of those who were public
sector employees whilst pregnant, 76% accessed paid maternity leave, compared to 27% in the
private sector (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2007: 135). HILDA includes data on paid maternity
leave entitlement. But it is poorly reported, with missing values recorded for approximately 40%
of females in the sample used here, most of whom did not know whether they were entitled. Paid
maternity leave may have a downward effect on public sector wages for females to the extent
that they are willing to sacrifice some earnings in order to access this benefit. See Edwards (2006)
for recent evidence of a compensating wage differential associated with paid maternity leave in
Australia.

6

Author’s calculations from the SEAS Expanded Confidentialised Unit Record File. The percentage

contribution was calculated by the author for each employee as total employer contributions divided by
usual weekly income from main job. The sample was restricted to employees, excluding employees of own
business. People with more than one job were excluded as the employer contribution variable does not
differentiate between jobs. At the time of the survey, the minimum legislated employer contribution was
8%. Employees with monthly income below $450 per month are exempt, as are those under 18 years of age
working less than 30 hours per week. Thus it is reasonable for the average contribution to be less than 8%.
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There may also be sectoral differences in job security and flexibility and differences in the utility
derived from the work itself. Such factors would induce compensating wage differentials in less
attractive jobs. These are only partly measured by the casual status variable (which will capture
some of the effects of job instability) and the shiftwork variable (which will capture the
compensation paid for the disutility of shift work), as discussed in the following section. No
controls are included for industry and occupation. This implies an assumption that the industries
and occupations of jobs in one sector are not generally less appealing compared to the other
sector, in the sense that they detract from utility directly. Some supporting evidence for this
assumption is presented in the following sections. It is shown in Section IV that the inclusion of
industry and occupation controls in related models makes almost no difference to the estimates.
Further, there is no evidence of sectoral differences in work stress and work satisfaction in
Australia, as discussed in Section V. At a practical level, the samples in the preferred models are
too small to accurately identify compensating differentials off movers between industries and
occupations.
We do not control for size of employer or union status. The public sector is a highly unionised
workforce characterised by large employers. Both of these factors are associated with higher
hourly earnings (Miller and Mulvey 1996; Wooden 2001). We treat these as inherent features of
the public sector which we do not abstract from. Wooden (2001) has shown that in the Australian
labour market, characterised by enterprise bargaining, the effect of unions on wages operates at
the level of the workplace rather than the individual. Thus workers in highly unionised workplaces
enjoy a wage premium, regardless of their personal union membership. Since HILDA does not
include such data on the workplace, any attempt to explicitly account for the effect of
unionisation is likely to be misleading.

III DATA
The data used for this study are from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia
(HILDA) Survey. HILDA is a nationally representative household-based panel survey, with annual
observations taken since 2001, with an initial sample of 7682 households and 19,914 individuals.
The analysis utilises all eight available waves (2001-2008).
The estimation sample is defined as the set of employees who changed employers between any
two consecutive observations (e.g. between Waves 1 & 2; or between Waves 2 & 3; and so on). 7
7

Employees employed by their own business at either observation were excluded.
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The restriction to job changers is because sector of employment is self reported and thus may be
measured with error. 8 Since only a small proportion of employees change sectors between
consecutive years, a large proportion of apparent sector movers may be incorrectly identified due
to reporting error. Indeed, preliminary analysis revealed that more than half of apparent sector
movers did not report a change in employer in the same period, suggesting that a large
proportion of movers may be misclassified.9 To address this issue, the sample is limited to those
who reported a change in employer, which follows Lemieux’s (1998) approach.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of hourly earnings. Hourly earnings are derived as
‘current weekly gross wage and salary in main job’ divided by ‘hours per week usually worked in
main job’. Wage inflation is accounted for by scaling observed wages in each year by genderspecific full time ordinary time average weekly earnings to 2008 levels.
The only observed characteristics included in the model (X) are dummy variables for shift or
irregular work and for ‘casual’ employment contracts. The shift work variable captures any
compensating wage differentials resulting from the disutility of shift work. 10 The casual status
variable is included because the wages of ‘casual’ employees usually include a loading that
compensates for a lack of entitlements received under other contracts. The size of such loadings,
however, varies considerably, depending on the Award or enterprise agreement under which an
employee is covered. Watson (2005) notes a variation of 15% to 33.3% amongst enterprise
bargaining agreement in the ACIRRT ADAM database between 1994-2002. The loading is also
between 15% and 33% in most Awards, but is sometimes less than this and can be as high as 50%
(Owens 2001). Furthermore, many self-identified casuals do not receive any loading at all
(Wooden and Warren 2003). A manual adjustment to the wages of casual workers is considered
infeasible, since it is unclear how large such an adjustment would need to be. Thus the size of the
loading is estimated by the model. Secondly, it is possible that average casual loadings are
8

Public sector employees are those who identified their employer as a ‘Government business enterprise or

commercial statutory authority’ or ‘Other governmental organisation’.
9

There are, however, a number of other possible explanations. It may result from reporting errors in the

change in employer variable, since this relies on retrospective recall. It is also possible for employees to
change sector without changing employer. This is the case when a public corporation is privatised. In any
case, the conservative approach is taken here, by limiting the sample to employees who reported a change
in employer.
10

Current work schedule is self-reported. Shift work is defined as any schedule other than a ‘regular

daytime schedule’. Most employees classified as shift workers reported ‘A rotating shift (changes from days
to evenings to nights)’; an ‘Irregular schedule’; or a ‘Regular Evening Schedule’.
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different between the two sectors. In the main set of estimates, however, the loading is
constrained to be equal, because no significant difference is found between sectors when the
parameter is allowed to vary. The results are not sensitive to this restriction as will be shown.
Separate models are estimated for men and for women. Exclusions from the sample are detailed
in Table 1. Observations were excluded due to missing data at either observation (missing wage,
sector, highest educational qualification, casual or shift status). Observations were also excluded
where the real wage was recorded to have changed by more than one log point between
observations (i.e. by a factor of more than 2.72). A small number of people whose highest
educational qualification changed between observations were excluded to ensure that education
is time invariant, as discussed in the previous section. The estimation sample consists of 2703
men and 2520 women.
The sector movers consist of 294 men and 461 women. These observations identify δ and ψ.
Casual status changed between observations for 741 men and 767 women. These records identify
the estimated casual loading. Shift work status changed between observations for 628 men and
663 women. These records identify the estimated compensation for shift work.
Table 2 shows weighted means for the main sample by sex and sector. It also facilitates
comparisons of the characteristics of sector movers to that of the full sample. This table shows
that the raw public-private difference in mean log wages is 0.14 for men and 0.23 for women.
Public sector employees are much more likely to hold a degree or higher qualification and to work
in professional occupations. Amongst females, public sector employees also have more
experience, less so for men. Private sector employees are more likely to be employed in casual
jobs and to work in shift work arrangements. It is also clear that sector movers are similar to the
rest of the sample, with their mean characteristics lying between the public and private means on
most measures. Approximately half of male job changers also changed occupation, regardless of
sector. This proportion is slightly higher for male sector movers (57%). Amongst females, the
proportion of sector changers who changed occupation was similar to that of job changers
overall.
Table 3 facilitates an evaluation of the extent to which sector movers resemble the set of all
employees (not just job changers). It is based on Table 2, with the sample expanded to the set of
all employees. The mean characteristics of sector movers are similar to that of all employees in
most regards. The main differences are that sector movers are less experienced (especially
amongst males) and had worked for their employer for a shorter period (at t-1). Amongst males,
they are also less likely to be ‘Managers’.
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The wage distribution of sector movers is compared to that of other groups in Figure 1 and Figure
2. Figure 1 shows that the wage distribution of sector movers is very similar to that of all job
changers, especially those in the public sector. Figure 2 shows that the wage distribution of sector
movers is not strikingly different to that of all employees in each sector either, perhaps
resembling the private sector distribution slightly more than the public sector distribution.
A slightly higher proportion of sector movers moved into the public sector rather than away from
the public sector (60% of male sector movers and 57% of female sector movers). This is not
surprising given that public sector workers are more experienced on average. There were no
major changes in this proportion across the years included in the sample.
It was suggested in Section II that an approximate test of instrument relevance is to test whether
the mean wage of public sector leavers is different to that of joiners. The results of such tests are
shown in Table 4, which shows the mean ln wage for public sector joiners and leavers, across both
observations, so that both the public and private sector wage is included in the calculation for
each employee. There is clear evidence that public sector leavers have a higher wage than public
sector jointers amongst both males and females (a difference of 0.103 for males and 0.070 for
females). These differences are statistically significant (p = 0.030 for males; p = 0.012 for females)
which provides evidence for instrument relevance (see section II.B). If the male and female
samples are pooled, the evidence is stronger still (p = 0.002). For this reason, the model is reestimated for a pooled sample of males and females as a robustness test. It will be shown that the
three sets of results, that for men, women and overall are similar and that the key estimates for
the pooled model lie in between that of the male and female models.
The middle panel of Table 4 shows mean log wage changes leavers, joiners and job changers who
did not change sector. Relative to job changers who did not change sector, the log wage of public
sector joiners increased by a mean of 0.041. The corresponding change for leavers is a decrease of
0.054. Thus endogenous sector switching does not appear to have empirical support in this
application. Table 4 also shows the numbers of leavers and joiners in the sample, which are fairly
similar.
Figure 3 shows the wage distributions for leavers and joiners (averaged across their public and
private sector observations). These are similar, strongly suggesting that leavers and joiners are
similarly distributed across the skill distribution. The corresponding distributions by sex (not
shown) are noisier, but lead to the same qualitative conclusion.
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IV RESULTS
A

Parameter Estimates

The results of the GMM estimation are shown in Table 5. There is no evidence of sectoral
differences in returns to skills. A value of ψ that is less than 1 suggests that returns to skills are
smaller in the public sector than the private sector. For males, ψ is estimated to be 0.954, while
for females it is 1.118. In the pooled model it is 0.960. This parameter is not significantly different
from 1 in any model. Thus there is no evidence to suggest that the size of the public sector wage
premium depends on the level of skill. This important result is considered in more detail in Section
V.
The constant effect ( δ ) of public sector employment on wages is estimated to be positive and
small (0.044 for men and 0.042 for women). This parameter is statistically significant for men (p =
0.038), and borders on significance for women (p = 0.073). The estimate is slightly higher in the
pooled model across sexes (0.052) and is highly significant.
Positive and statistically significant loadings for casual status are estimated for both sexes and in
the pooled model. Compensation for shift work is not statistically significant. The coefficients of
casual and shift were constrained to be equal across sectors in the results reported in, since Wald
tests do not reject the hypothesis of equality across sectors for either parameter in any model.
The results are not sensitive to these restrictions, as will be shown.
The Hansen statistic, reported at the bottom of Table 5, facilitates partial tests of instrument
validity in overidentified GMM models. It is equal to the minimised value of the objective function
multiplied by the sample size. Under the null hypothesis the statistic follows a χ2 distribution with
degrees of freedom equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions, which is the difference
between the number of instruments and the number of parameters (Hansen 1982). In the models
estimated here, there are 14 overidentifying restrictions. In the male and pooled models the pvalues greatly exceed 0.05 and so the null hypothesis is not rejected. In the female model the pvalue is slightly less than the critical value (0.044). However this may simply result from parameter
heterogeneity in the population, with the different instruments picking up various local averages.

B

Decomposition of the Raw Wage Gap

The decomposition results are shown in Table 6. The main result is that the average public sector
wage premium is estimated to be positive but small for men (0.040), slightly larger for women
(0.059), with the estimate from the pooled model lying between the two (0.048). Statistically, this
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estimate is significantly different from zero for women (p<0.001) and the pooled model (p<0.001),
but not for men (p=0.072). 11 The 95% confidence intervals are (-0.004, 0.083) for men, (0.029,
0.089) for women and (0.022, 0.073) overall. These imply an average public sector wage premium
of e0.040 – 1 = 4.1% for men, e0.059 – 1 = 6.1% for women and e0.048 – 1 = 4.9% overall.
Returning to Table 6, the majority of the raw wage gap is explained by differences in
characteristics. In particular, the largest component of the wage gap is accounted for by sectoral
differences in the stock of time invariant skills (which include education, experience and
unobserved characteristics). In each model, this is a positive effect, suggesting that the average
public sector employee is more skilled than their private sector counterpart. This is consistent
with Table 2, which shows that they are more educated and more experienced. Differences in
casual and shiftwork status are not major factors.

C

Robustness Tests

This subsection considers the robustness of the results with respect to a number of modifications
to the preferred model. As discussed by Stock et al. (2002: 527), sensitivity to minor
methodological changes is suggestive of weak identification in nonlinear GMM models. The
estimates of primary interest are δ (the constant effect of public sector employment on wages),

ψ (returns to skills in the public sector relative the private sector), and the total average effect of
public sector employment on wages. These are shown for a range of alternate specifications in
Table 7.
The first set of results are for a model where returns to ‘casual’ and ‘shift’ are not constrained to
be equal in the two sectors. These estimates are similar to that of the preferred model, though
they are slightly less precise, reflecting the increase in the number of parameters estimated by
the model. The constant effect δ becomes statistically insignificant. As shown in the next two
sets of results, if the models are estimated by NLIV or iterated GMM, the results are very similar
to the preferred model. When sample weights are applied, the estimates also remain similar to
the preferred model.

11

The results of the decomposition are a function of the estimated coefficients and the sample means. The

standard errors of the decomposition take account of the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated
parameter vector. They also take account of the standard errors on the sample means. They also account
for the fact that the estimated mean time invariant characteristics of workers in each sector ( θ P and
are functions of the estimated parameters and the sample means.
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θR )

In the next seven sets of results, the sample is restricted to job changers between any single pair
of consecutive waves (e.g. between Waves 1 & 2 only). Thus the sample size is severely restricted
to approximately one seventh of the main models. Consequently, the estimates vary between
these models. It is clear, however, that the changes to the estimates are always within reasonable
realms of sampling error (the majority of point estimates are within one standard error of those in
the preferred model, almost all are within two standard errors, and all are within three standard
errors). This constitutes strong support for the validity of inference for the main set of estimates.
Thus the results are generally robust to the methodological modifications considered.
The final set of results in Table 7 was generated by estimating the quasi-differenced wage
equation (equation 7) by nonlinear least squares, thereby ignoring the endogeneity of ln wit −1 .
The standard errors on these estimates are smaller than in the preferred model (especially for ψ),
but they are qualitatively similar. Like in the preferred model, the estimates of δ are small
positives for both sexes and the estimates of ψ are not significantly different from 1. The average
wage premiums are also positive, statistically significant and similar to the preferred model.

D

Comparison with other Methods

The estimated average public sector wage premiums are compared in Table 8 to corresponding
estimates generated through other methods.
The OLS and Oaxaca decomposition models are estimated using observations for employees
across all six waves of HILDA. 12 Observations are excluded if the real recorded wage was less that
$5 per hour or more than $100 per hour. Control variables include experience, experience
squared, highest educational qualification (6 dummy variables), casual status, shift work status,
years with current employer, years in current occupation, occupation (46 dummy variables for
men; 43 for women), proficiency in English (3 dummy variables), married, state or territory (7
dummy variables) and remoteness (3 dummy variables). 13 The OLS and Oaxaca decomposition
results do not differ greatly, suggesting that differences in returns to observed characteristics are
not a major driver of the average wage differential. Using the similar data, Cai and Liu (2011) also
estimated the average public wage premium using OLS and Oaxaca decompositions. Their
estimates are lower than those in Table 8, and are in some cases negative. Much of this
discrepancy is explained by their inclusion of control variables for employer size.

12

The decompositions were estimated using the user-written Stata module –oaxaca– (Jann, 2008)

13

Industry dummies are not included due to the heavy industrial segregation of public sector employment.
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The fixed effects and first difference (full controls) models use the same variables and the same
sample as the OLS model, with the following exceptions. Employees with only a single observation
are excluded from the fixed effects model. Employees without consecutive observations are
excluded from the first difference model. Employees whose wage changed by more than one log
point were also excluded in each model. These results suggest that for both sexes, some of the
apparent public sector wage premium may be explained by higher unobserved skills of public
sector employees. 14 However, these estimates are likely to be subject to considerable attenuation
bias due to reporting error in the sector variable, as discussed above in the description of the
data.
The next estimates are also generated using a first difference approach. Here, the set of control
variables is limited to those in the preferred model and education changers are excluded. The
results here are quite similar to the previous model, suggesting that the larger set of controls
makes little difference to the estimates, thereby justifying their exclusion from our preferred
model.
To examine the issue of attenuation bias, a third pair of first difference results is estimated with
the sample limited to job changers (the same sample as the preferred model). For both sexes, the
estimated wage premium is considerably larger than the previous estimate, which conforms to
the hypothesised attenuation bias in the larger sample.
The first difference model estimated on the job changer sample is equivalent to the preferred
model with ψ restricted to equal 1. Since ψ is estimated to be close to 1, so it is unsurprising that
the estimated average wage premiums are similar in the first difference models.

V CONCLUSION
We have used an adaptation of Lemieux’s (1993, 1998) quasi-differenced panel data estimator to
test whether the public sector wage premium varies with skill in Australia. This estimator allows
us to identify sectoral differences in returns to a latent index of overall skill. We find no evidence
to suggest that the public sector wage premium varies with skill. This suggests that if low skill
public sector workers receive a wage premium, it is no larger than that of high skill workers. This
is despite the typical results of quantile regressions, which suggest that the premium is usually
much larger at the bottom of the wage distribution. How can these results be reconciled? The
quantile regression results could be explained by greater variance in private sector wages for a
14

The fixed effects models were estimated using the user-written Stata module –xtivreg2– (Schaffer, 2005)
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given level of skill. Another explanation is that the compressed wage profile of the public sector
induces the best workers (on unobserved skills) to join the public sector in low wage occupations,
vice versa in high wage occupations. This would be consistent with the recent work of Bargain &
Melly (2008) for France, who use a fixed effects quantile regression approach. Whilst they are
unable to account for differences in returns to unobserved skills, they find that the apparent
variation in the French public sector wage premium across the wage distribution is mostly
explained by sector selection on unobserved skills. French public sector workers were found to
have higher unobserved skills at the bottom of the wage distribution, while the opposite is true at
the top of the distribution.
Our findings suggest that caution should be taken before inferring (from quantile regression) that
low skill public sector workers are considerably overpaid. If the public sector does attract the best
workers (on unobservables) in low skill occupations, this is likely to translate to higher
productivity. The finding also calls into question the ability of governments to use wage setting
policies to achieve redistributive goals. If, for instance, governments aim to provide a wage
premium to public sector workers in low wage occupations, it may simply be inducing the best
workers (on unobserved characteristics) to join the public sector.
Our results are consistent with concerns over the ability of the public sector to retain highly skilled
workers. When compared to the results of Cai & Liu (2011), the lack of a public sector wage
penalty for high skill workers in our study suggests that the best workers (on unobserved
characteristics) in high wage occupations select into the private sector.
Further research is required to investigate these issues, since this literature has paid insufficient
attention to sectoral differences in unobserved skills (and in their returns). In particular, the
standard errors for ψ must be taken into account. The 95% confidence intervals do not rule out
moderate sectoral differences in returns to skills. It would thus be useful to conduct related
studies using other data sources.
We also find that the average Australian public sector employee is paid slightly more than he or
she would be paid in the private sector. The preferred estimates of this public sector wage
premium are 4% for men and 6% for women, though the estimate is not statistically significant for
men. This does not include the value of benefits such as superannuation and paid maternity leave
which are also more generous in the public sector. This positive average premium is consistent
with most of the international literature on this topic. It may result from the higher rates of
unionisation in the public sector. It is also possible that this ‘premium’ compensates public sector
workers for unfavourable working environments. However, the evidence for Australia suggests
19

little or no sectoral difference in levels of work-related stress or job satisfaction (Lewig and
Dollard 2001; Macklin et al. 2006).
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Table 1 Sample selection (number of observations)

Men

Women

Pooled

3116
149

3043
225

6159
374

outliers

103

88

191

changed education

161

210

371

2703

2520

5223

Job changers between any consecutive waves
with missing data

Final sample
Table 2 Sample means – job changers*

Public

Men
Private

3.26
15.4

3.12
14.5

3.18
14.8

3.21
15.4

2.98
12.6

3.13
14.1

University degree

0.46

0.17

0.34

0.52

0.21

0.43

Trade

0.22

0.38

0.29

0.19

0.29

0.23

Year 12

0.16

0.21

0.18

0.16

0.26

0.19

less than Year 12

0.16

0.24

0.19

0.13

0.24

0.16

Casual

0.17

0.27

0.20

0.21

0.37

0.26

Shift / irregular

0.20

0.23

0.22

0.18

0.26

0.23

Managers

0.06

0.10

0.03

0.05

0.07

0.06

Professionals

0.39

0.15

0.32

0.48

0.17

0.38

Technicians and Trades Workers

0.13

0.25

0.19

0.02

0.05

0.02

Community and Personal Service Workers

0.12

0.05

0.12

0.14

0.16

0.18

Clerical and Administrative Workers

0.15

0.08

0.13

0.27

0.29

0.28

Sales Workers

0.02

0.10

0.05

0.01

0.17

0.04

Machinery Operators and Drivers

0.04

0.13

0.05

0.00

0.01

0.01

Labourers And Related Workers

0.09

0.16

0.11

0.02

0.08

0.03

Tenure (years) with employer at t-1

3.50

2.74

3.62

3.19

2.41

2.87

Changed occupation between observations

0.53

0.48

0.57

0.41

0.46

0.46

Sample size

300

2,403

294

479

2,041

461

Variable

ln wage
Experience (years)

Sector
Movers

Women
Public Private

Sector
Movers

Education

Occupation

* The sample is limited to that of the main analysis as reported in the text. ‘Public’ denotes all public sector
employees who changed employer since the previous observation. ‘Private’ denotes all private sector
employees who changed employer since the previous observation. ‘Sector movers’ denotes all employees who
changed employer and sector since the previous observation.
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Table 3 Sample means – all employees*

Men
Private

3.37
23.1

Sector
Movers
3.12
3.18
17.5
14.8

University degree

0.42

0.18

Trade

0.34

Year 12
less than Year 12

Women
Public Private
3.26
19.6

Sector
Movers
2.97
3.13
14.6
14.1

0.34

0.50

0.20

0.43

0.36

0.29

0.23

0.26

0.23

0.11

0.18

0.18

0.11

0.22

0.19

0.13

0.27

0.19

0.16

0.32

0.16

Casual

0.08

0.22

0.20

0.14

0.35

0.26

Shift / irregular

0.24

0.26

0.22

0.22

0.27

0.23

Managers

0.11

0.13

0.03

0.06

0.07

0.06

Professionals

0.37

0.15

0.32

0.51

0.17

0.38

Technicians and Trades Workers

0.12

0.24

0.19

0.02

0.05

0.02

Community and Personal Service Workers

0.14

0.05

0.12

0.17

0.15

0.18

Clerical and Administrative Workers

0.14

0.07

0.13

0.20

0.25

0.28

Sales Workers

0.01

0.09

0.05

0.01

0.19

0.04

Machinery Operators and Drivers

0.06

0.13

0.05

0.00

0.01

0.01

Labourers And Related Workers

0.06

0.15

0.11

0.03

0.10

0.03

Tenure (years) with employer at t-1

10.57

4.92

3.62

7.93

3.82

2.87

Sample size

5,714

21,419

294

7,987

19,120

461

Variable
ln wage
Experience (years)

Public

Education

Occupation

* ‘Public’ denotes all public sector employees. ‘Private’ denotes all private sector employees. ‘Sector movers’
denotes all employees who changed employer and sector since the previous observation.
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Table 4 Mean wages of public sector leavers and joiners

Males

Females

mean ln wage
3.213
3.141
3.110
3.071
0.103
0.070
0.048
0.030
0.030
0.012

Leavers
Joiners
Difference
Standard error of difference
p-value of difference

Pooled
3.168
3.087
0.081
0.026
0.002

Leavers
Joiners
Other job changers (not sector switchers)

mean change in ln wage
-0.002
-0.009
-0.006
0.082
0.093
0.089
0.053
0.042
0.048

Leavers
Joiners
Other job changers (not sector switchers)

Number of observations
117
198
315
177
263
440
2,409
2,059
4,468

* The upper panel shows the mean log wage for public sector leavers and joiners, where for each switcher, the
log wage is averaged across one public sector observation and one private sector observation (the observations
immediately before and after the sector switch).
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Table 5 GMM estimates of wage equations*

Men
coefficient

Women
SE coefficient

Pooled
SE coefficient

SE

0.044

0.021

0.042

0.024

0.052

0.014

0.954

0.146

1.118

0.159

0.960

0.104

Casual

0.062

0.014

0.066

0.013

0.063

0.009

Shift Work

0.010

0.014

-0.017

0.015

-0.003

0.010

3.112

0.006

2.992

0.008

3.055

0.004

3.060

0.007

2.949

0.008

3.008

0.005

Constant effect ( δ )
Returns to time invariant skills
in public sector (ψ)
Returns to varying
characteristics

δ tR
δ tR−1
Hansen overidentification
statistic
(p-value)
Sample size

16.616

24.146

17.350

(0.277)

(0.044)

(0.238)

2703

2520

5223

* The dependent variable is the log wage. The sample is limited to that of the main analysis as reported in the
2
text. The Hansen overidentification test statistic follows a χ distribution with 14 degrees of freedom.

Table 6 Decomposition of Raw Average Wage Gap from GMM results

Men
Estimate

SE

Women
Estimate

SE

Pooled
Estimate

SE

Public Sector Wage Premium:
0.044 0.021

0.042 0.024

0.052 0.014

-0.005 0.015

0.017 0.022

-0.004 0.012

0.040 0.022

0.059 0.015

0.048 0.013

-0.006 0.002

-0.009 0.003

-0.007 0.001

0.110 0.022

0.176 0.016

0.132 0.013

Total effect of different
…characteristics

0.104 0.022

0.166 0.016

0.124 0.013

Unadjusted Wage Gap

0.144

0.225

0.172

constant effect ( δ )
differences in returns to fixed
…characteristics
Total average wage premium
Effect of differences in characteristics:
casual and shiftwork status
fixed characteristics
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Table 7 Sensitivity Tests of Main Results

δ
Unrestricted returns to casual and shift
Men
0.034
Women
0.011
NLIV
Men
0.048
Women
0.039
ITGMM
Men
0.044
Women
0.044
Weighted
Men
0.020
Women
0.036
Waves 1 & 2
Men
0.118
Women
0.003
Waves 2 & 3
Men
0.011
Women
0.025
Waves 3 & 4
Men
0.050
Women
0.082
Waves 4 & 5
Men
0.036
Women
-0.011
Waves 5 & 6
Men
0.030
Women
0.062
Waves 6 & 7
Men
0.048
Women
0.027
Waves 7 & 8
Men
-0.108
Women
-0.008
Nonlinear Least Squares
Men
0.047
Women
0.059

Average
public
wage
SE premium

SE

ψ

0.026
0.034

1.021
1.262

0.172
0.212

0.047
0.062

0.022
0.015

0.020
0.021

0.954
1.174

0.135
0.153

0.043
0.063

0.022
0.016

0.021
0.023

0.954
1.106

0.145
0.157

0.040
0.059

0.022
0.015

0.024
0.027

0.974
1.190

0.163
0.200

0.018
0.060

0.023
0.018

0.041
0.059

0.601
1.815

0.172
0.375

0.035
0.108

0.064
0.027

0.079
0.064

1.771
1.582

0.587
0.411

0.084
0.105

0.045
0.033

0.050
0.038

0.877
0.874

0.194
0.192

0.044
0.065

0.057
0.037

0.039
0.067

1.415
1.059

0.244
0.332

0.045
-0.003

0.031
0.038

0.036
0.043

0.694
0.937

0.093
0.161

-0.042
0.050

0.070
0.042

0.046
0.038

1.104
0.778

0.199
0.227

0.053
-0.013

0.044
0.052

0.129
0.060

2.494
1.530

0.841
0.454

0.024
0.055

0.042
0.027

0.020
0.016

0.957
0.936

0.042
0.040

0.043
0.050

0.020
0.016
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Table 8 Estimated Average Public Sector Wage Premium - Comparison to other Methods

Men

Women

Average
public
wage
premium

N

Average
public
wage
premium

SE

SE

N

OLS
Oaxaca decomposition

0.037
0.050

0.011
0.007

25,178
25,178

0.065
0.053

0.008
0.006

25,116
25,116

Fixed Effects

0.032

0.010

19,171

0.040

0.008

18,294

First Difference (full controls)

0.018

0.011

18,294

0.020

0.009

17,085

First Difference (limited controls)

0.024

0.012

17,736

0.022

0.009

16,849

First Difference (job changers only)

0.046

0.020

2,703

0.054

0.007

2,520

Quasi-Difference (preferred model)

0.040

0.022

2,703

0.059

0.015

2,520
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Figure 1 Density of ln wage distribution amongst job changers*
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* The sample is limited to that of the main analysis as reported in the text. ‘Public’ denotes all public sector
employees who changed employer since the previous observation. ‘Private’ denotes all private sector
employees who changed employer since the previous observation. ‘Sector movers’ denotes all employees who
changed employer and sector since the previous observation.
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Figure 2 Density of ln wage distribution amongst all employees*

0

.5

Density

1

1.5

Males

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

4

4.5

5

lwage
Public
Private
Sector movers

0

.5

Density

1

1.5

Females

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5
lwage
Public
Private
Sector movers

* ‘Public’ denotes all public sector employees. ‘Private’ denotes all private sector employees. ‘Sector movers’
denotes all employees who changed employer and sector since the previous observation.
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Figure 3 Density of ln wage distribution amongst public sector joiners and leavers*
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* The population is limited to sector switchers. For each switcher, the log wage is averaged across one public
sector observation and one private sector observation (the observations immediately before and after the
sector switch).
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